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Consumers Prioritize Mortgage Payments Over Auto

FICO Blog

We studied this on three pre-pandemic performance periods (pre-Great Recession 2005-2007, post-Great Recession 2010-2012, and pre-pandemic 2015-2017) as well as two pandemic-era periods (2020-2022 and a one-year period from 2021-2022).

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Addressing Portfolio Risk in Economic Uncertainty: Part 2 (2022)

FICO Blog

Assume an auto finance portfolio’s current underwriting risk management strategy requires applicants to have an expected 24-month default rate less than 3%. However, in the stressed economy of 2007-9, this would have aligned with a FICO Score cut-off of 720 or higher. Cells are highlighted where the expected default rate is below 3%.

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Quantitative Easing’s Positive Legacy for US Mortgage Holders

Loomis Sayles Credit Research

In our view, QE was successful in two distinct ways: 1) It increased housing affordability and suppressed defaults. Aggregate household mortgage payments plummeted from $600 billion in 2007 to $470 billion in 2022. in 2007 to 3.9% 2) It ensured a lower mortgage burden for a majority of US homeowners for the foreseeable future.

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High Yield Outlook: Catalysts for Wider Spreads Ahead

Loomis Sayles Credit Research

High yield spreads generally reflect the premium investors demand for accepting the risk of capital loss due to defaults. This helped pave the road for defaults to reach cycle lows. [i] Furthermore, t he lowest-quality (rated B+ and lower) cohort within the Bloomberg High Yield Index remains at the lowest levels since 2007. [ii].

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Corporate Health Indicators Signal an Economy in Transition

Loomis Sayles Credit Research

Leverage appears at manageable levels, defaults are currently low and the credit outlook has weakened only slightly. That was true when the tech bubble burst in the early 2000 s , in the financial crisis of 2007 to 2009 and in the brief COVID-induced recession of 2020. Pockets of strength.

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Demystifying Credit Crunches and What They Mean for Small Businesses

tillful

If too many borrowers default on loans around the same time, lenders not only lose a sizable amount of their forecasted profits, but can also lose a portion of the money they loaned out. So, what causes a group of borrowers to default around the same time? As homeowners defaulted across the U.S.

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Get your ducks in a row: HVCRE risk management

Abrigo

He starts by reviewing some of the data over the last decade, specifically the role that Acquisition, Development and Construction (ADC) loans played leading up to the 2007 recession. Ashbaugh goes on to demonstrate that the default rates for these loans did not peak until about 2009, and the ALLL did not increase until 2010.

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